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THE MEDICAL EXPENSE DEDUCTION FOR SRS 
SURGERY: A PERSONAL DEDUCTION WITH BUSINESS 
EFFECTS 
by 
David S. Kistler* 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper briefly explores the parameters for a medical 
deduction for a specific surgery. The issue presented is 
whether sexual reassignment surgery (SRS) is a nondeductible 
cosmetic surgery procedure or a deductible medical expense, in 
that it represents a necessarily prescribed treatment for a 
medical disease. This issue has been raised in a recent tax 
court case filed by Rhiannon 0 'Donnabhain against the 
C . . I ommzsswner. 
Although a personal deduction is not a business 
expense, many personal deductions affect businesses and are of 
great concern to specific industries. Examples include interest 
expense on home mortgages and medical expenses. The 
former is a deduction favored by the home builders and 
banking industries. The later is a deduction of concern to the 
insurance and medical industries. All deductions are of interest 
to tax preparation businesses. 
*DavidS. Kistler is an Assistant Professor of Business 
at the State University of New York at Potsdam. 
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One specific type of medical deduction is the SRS 
procedure. This procedure is used to treat Gender Identity 
Disorder (Gill) and involves both physicians and 
psychotherapists. Additional surgical procedures may also be 
undertaken by individuals diagnosed with SRS. This includes 
breast implant surgery, trachea shaving, nose realignment, lip 
augmentation, cheek implants, chin shrinkage, and scalp 
forwarding procedures. It is estimated that "1,000 to 2,000 
Americans a year ... undergo sex-change operations."2 This 
paper will explore the arguments for and against allowing this 
expense as a tax deduction. 
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE & TREASURY 
REGULATIONS 
Several parts of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) § 213 
apply to the question of deductibility regarding a surgical 
operation. The first subsection of this general rule of law 
allows a deduction for medical expenses and reads "There shall 
be allowed as a deduction the expenses paid during the taxable 
year ... for medical care of the taxpayer."3 The second 
subsection defines medical care as the "amount paid for the 
diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, 
or for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the 
body."4 The third subsection that is applicable is a limitation 
restricting the term medical care by excluding "cosmetic 
surgery or other similar procedures."5 Finally, there is the 
subsection where cosmetic surgery is defined as "any 
procedure which is directed at improving the patient's 
appearance and does not meaningfully promote the proper 
function of the body or prevent or treat illness or disease."6 
The Internal Revenue Regulations add insight to the 
Internal Revenue Code. In Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(l)(ii) it is 
stated that "[I.R.C.] § 213 will be confined strictly to expenses 
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incurred primarily for the prevention or alleviation of a 
physical or mental defect or illness." The Regulations also 
state that the question of a medical expense is "a question of 
fact which depends upon the condition of the individual and the 
nature of the services he receives."7 
SETTING THE STAGE 
The issue of whether or not to take an I.R.C. § 213 
deduction for a medical surgery has several court created 
guidelines. These general rules attempt to clarify the question 
of what is deductible. Decisions made generally rest upon a 
question of fact. 
In Thoene v. Comm 'r8 the plaintiff took dance lessons 
to help correct emotional and physical problems with he had 
been diagnosed. Upon the advice of his doctor and 
psychiatrist, petitioner took dance lessons to become engaged 
with people while in a social environment for these problems. 
Tax Court applied a rule that stated expenses which are 
normally considered personal items are not deductible. The 
dance lessons were deemed to be a normal personal item by the 
court. It was found that no physical or psychiatric therapy 
resulted from the dance lessons. Tax Court also stated that 
there would be "rare situations when such expenses would lose 
their identity as ordinary personal expenses and become 
properly classified as medical care expenses."9 The tax court 
also was stated that "not every expenditure prescribed by a 
physician is . . . a medical expense."10 Neither would the 
characterization of the treatment as beneficial be sufficient to 
allow a deduction as a medical expense. 
Other cases support this reasoning. In Miz/ 11 the 
petitioner took a cruise to help lessen the physical problems of 
hypertension, latent diabetes, and arteriosclerotic heart disease. 
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Petitioner's physician never recommended the cruise. The Tax 
Court found that the cruise was similarly related to a vacation 
because it was not essential to the health of the petitioner. The 
rule established was that expenses for a person's general health 
are not deductible even if recommended by a doctor. 
In Revenue Ruling 97-9 the taxpayer, based upon a 
doctor's recommendation, obtained a controlled substance for 
medical reasons. This was a violation of federal law 
(Controlled Substances Act). The Revenue Ruling stated that 
expenses for a drug are not deductible if such a purchase 
violates federal law notwithstanding the fact that a physician 
recommended the purchase or that state law allows the 
purchase. 
In Levine, 12 the Tax Court held that legal expenses for 
the supervision of a mentally deficient person were not 
deductible as a medical expense. Legal expenses are 
deductible only if they are incurred in the pursuit of medical 
care. The rule established for a medical deduction was the "but 
for" test. The petitioner is required "to prove both that the 
expenditures were an essential element of the treatment and 
that they would not have otherwise been incurred for 
nonmedical reasons." 13 
A reverse situation occurred in Al-Murshidi, where the 
opinion of a physician that an expenditure was cosmetic was 
deemed to be incorrect based on the facts. The petitioner had 
severe obesity. The Tax Court found that the excess skin 
caused "skin breakdowns, sores, infections, pain, and 
irritation." 14 The physician, a plastic surgeon, referred to the 
corrective surgery as "cosmetic." The Tax Court stated that 
obesity is a well recognized disease and that the excess skin 
caused several medical problems. It was held that the surgery 
to remove the excess skin was a deductible expense. A special 
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note regarding this case is that under I.R.C. § 7463 " this 
opinion should not be cited as authority" 15 because it is only a 
memorandum decision. 
The personal expenditure for medical reasons rule is a 
presumption and can be overcome by sufficient evidence. A 
satisfactory nonmedical reason would be an expense for 
business purposes. Such a situation took place in a case 
regarding a breast enlargement. In Hess, 16 the petitioner 
underwent surgery multiple times to enlarge her breasts to a 
size 56N. Each silicone breast implant weighed approximately 
10 pounds. Normally, a breast enlargement surgery would be 
considered a personal expenditure. However, the court found 
that an enlargement of this proportion "made her [petitioner] 
appear 'freakish. "'17 Petitioner claimed that the implants were 
only for her business as a professional exotic dancer and the 
court found that her fees almost doubled after the surgery. A 
similarity was drawn between the implants and a stage prop or 
clothing that is useful only in a business setting. The Tax court 
ruled in this situation that the "implants were so extraordinarily 
large . . . that they were useful only in her business."18 Tax 
court relied upon the ordinary and necessary standard for 
business expenses. 
Acceptable medical treatment expenses which are 
deductible also include items that affect the body in structure or 
function. In Revenue Ruling 2003-57 this concept included 
breast reconstruction surgery due to cancer in that it 
"ameliorates a deformity directly related to a disease"19 and 
laser eye surgery because it "is a procedure that meaningfully 
promotes the proper function of the body."20 Revenue Ruling 
1973-201 included expenses for prevention "of conception and 
childbirth or to terminate pregnancy."21 This ruling also 
covered vasectomies on the grounds that "purpose of the 
operation is to affect both a structure and a function of the 
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body"22 and therefore, deductible. Such operations do not need 
the recommendation of a physician. Revenue Ruling 73-603 
allowed a deduction for an abortion where the petitioner sought 
the operation without advice of a physician. 
In 2004, Katherine T. Pratt indicated in a Cornell Law 
Review article that "several courts have also held that sexual 
reassignment surgery for treatment of a transsexual with 
Gender Identity Disorder is a medical necessity."23 The article, 
however, cites only one case, Pinneke v. Preisser.24 The Eight 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Pinneke stated that "from this 
record, it appears that radical sex conversion surgery is the 
only medical treatment available to relieve or solve the 
problems of a true transsexual. "25 
THE PROBLEM 
In the current case of Rhiannon O'Donnabhain, the 
petitioner took a deduction for SRS and other surgical 
operations (breast implant surgery, trachea shaving, nose 
realignment, lip augmentation, cheek implants, chin shrinkage, 
scalp forward procedures). Petitioner desired to completely 
change his body function from male to female. The Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) initially allowed the deductions, but 
then denied the deductions as cosmetic surgery and sent her a 
deficiency notice. O' Donnabhain filed suit in Tax Court in 
2007 rather than pay the deficiency notice. 
On behalf of the Petitioner, there were two 
psychotherapists that examined the taxpayer and both 
concluded that the taxpayer had GID. It was also found that 
the "the strict pre-surgery criteria of the Harry Benjamin 
Standards"26 had been met. These criteria included 12 months 
of receiving hormone therapy to begin a change from a male 
body to a female body, living as a female for 12 months before 
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a SRS operation (referred to as "real-life experience"), and 
receiving ongoing psychotherapy to adjust for the change. The 
taxpayer showed that GID is a recognized disease as stated in 
the American Psychological Association's handbook on mental 
disorders, The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, l h Edition (DSM-N) (hereafter referred to as the 
AP A handbook). SRS is the recommended medically 
necessary treatment for this mental disorder (GID). 
The deduction is attacked by the IRS from a number of 
different positions. First, two expert witnesses are utilized to 
discredit SRS treatment. Dr. Park Dietz's testimony attempts 
supports the position that GID is not a pathology problem and 
thus not a disease. Pathology is defined as 
abnormal, either an anatomic or physiologic disease. 7 The 
testimony of Dr. Chester Schmidt, Jr. is intends to support the 
position that SRS is not able to meaningfully treat GID and that 
GID is not a universally accepted diagnosis. Second, the IRS 
uses the APA handbook against Petitioner because it has 
limiting statements. Some disorders stated in the AP A 
handbook are clearly identified as being merely social or 
behavior problems. Examples are caffeine intoxication, sleep 
disorder, and jet lag. In addition, a cautionary statement is 
made in the AP A handbook that a specific category may not 
meet legal criteria for a disease. The final argument by the IRS 
is that surgery and hormone treatment to bring about an 
appearance change is cosmetic in nature. 
ANALYSIS 
The pathology argument by Dr. Dietz is simply not 
substantiated. No Internal Revenue Code section, Treasury 
Regulation, court case, Revenue Ruling, or Revenue 
Memorandum supports the position that deductibility is denied 
if a disease, either anatomic or physiologic, is not of an 
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abnormal nature. Abnormality or normality is not the standard 
to determine deductibility. There are many physical diseases 
that are rare in occurrence or nature, but have treatments 
acceptable as medical deductions. 
The APA Handbook itself contradicts Dr. Schmidt's 
belief that SRS is not a meaningful treatment for GID. This 
"bible" of The American Psychological Association states the 
generally recognized standards of treatment for its listed mental 
and psychological diseases. Although Dr. Schmidt is correct in 
stating that GID is not accepted by all medical practitioners as 
the accepted diagnosis, GID is widely held to be the standard 
diagnosis for this mental condition. 
Statements in the AP A handbook are not decisive in 
and of themselves. Although some disorders in the AP A 
handbook are categorized as merely social or behavior 
problems, GID is not one of them. Therefore, the terminology 
of behavioral problem does not apply to SRS. In addition, the 
cautionary statement in the AP A handbook regarding the legal 
criteria is a general disclaimer that the psychological viewpoint 
of a disease may not meet the legal definition. Each specific 
disorder mentioned in the AP A handbook, then, has to be 
examined. The real question is, what is the legal standard? 
The problem here is one of a mental disorder, which is not 
easily accepted as a medical problem due to the failure to see a 
need for a physical correction. 
Finally, it is the IRS position on SRS "that sex-change 
surgery is a choice, like cosmetic surgery, rather than a 
deductible medical expense like psychiatric care."28 However, 
the question of choice is not the standard set by the Internal 
Revenue Code, the Treasury Regulations, or the courts for the 
deductibility of a surgical operation. The IRS argument is that 
this surgery is merely an improvement on one's appearance 
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and that it is for personal satisfaction. The IRS could also 
argue that the surgery does not promote a proper body function 
in that the body the petitioners have already functions properly. 
The petitioner simply desires a different function. There is no 
restoration of the body to normal functioning and there is no 
avoidance of immediate danger of physical harm. Many of the 
individual procedures obtained by petitioner could be 
construed as personal expenditures. The Senate Finance 
Committee report in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1990, for example, stated that "procedures such as hair 
removal electrolysis, hair transplants, liposuction, and face lift 
operations generally are not deductible."29 The IRS could take 
the position that SRS is a choice for psychological distress only 
in that the petitioner is seeking a correction in perception of 
him or her self. However, the APA handbook states that GID 
is "a profound disturbance of the individual's sense of identity 
with regards to"30 their sex. 
In examining the question of choice, SRS "is not treated 
by physicians as a purely elective surgery like cosmetic 
surgery."31 The general viewpoint of psychotherapists is that 
SRS "allows a person to function better and be more 
comfortable in society. "32 GID is considered a mental disease 
and SRS is a corrective measure or treatment. What must be 
kept in mind is that the opinion of physicians has not been 
always a standard employed to determine deductibility. For 
example, in Thoene the physician recommended the treatment 
of dance lessons for which the petitioner was denied a 
deductible medical expense. Tax Court denied the deduction. 
The court stated that the opinion of a physician is not a 
standard to examine the question of deductibility. In a reverse 
situation, the physician in Al-Murshidi referred to the treatment 
as cosmetic, but the Tax Court held that the expenditure was a 
deductible medical expense. 
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Petitioner claims that having GID causes "severe 
emotional pain"33 and that SRS is required for a normallife.34 
Life in the current state for petitioner was very unsatisfying35 
and there could have been psychological or physical damage to 
his or her well-being.36 These statements are supported by the 
doctors who examined petitioner and required pre-determined 
criteria (Harry Benjamin Standards)37 to be completed before 
SRS was approved. GID was considered a congenital 
abnormality (defect at birth) for petitioner.38 
CONCLUSION 
Relying upon the Internal Revenue Code and the 
Treasury Regulations the correct standard for surgery is 
defined as a "diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment or 
prevention of disease. "39 A limitation for a nonallowable 
deduction exists in I.R.C. § 213 for cosmetic surgery. There is 
a two-pronged requirement under this limitation in that the 
cosmetic type of surgery is for improving the petitioner's 
appearance and not treating a disease. The Internal Revenue 
Code and the Treasury Regulations both recognize mental and 
physical illnesses or diseases. Both state that a medical 
expense is deductible for the alleviation of a mental illness. 
GID is defined by psychotherapists as a mental disorder in the 
AP A handbook. SRS is used to treat the recognized disease of 
GID. Using these standards, SRS is a medical deductible 
expense. 
Several rules have been established from Tax Court 
cases. First, there is the "rare situation" standard. The Thoene 
case established that an expense usually deemed as a personal 
item can be a medical expense deduction except for "rare 
situations." SRS is certainly not a rare procedure if 1 ,000 to 
2,000 such operations are performed each year. 
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Next, the question is what is personal? SRS has never 
been clearly defined as a personal item. The Tax Court in Hess 
stated that neither the Internal Revenue Code nor the Treasury 
Regulations "contain a definition of 'personal. "'40 Normally, 
breast implants have been treated as personal expenditures 
because the surgery is done to enhance the appearance of the 
taxpayer. However, in Hess the breast implants were held to 
be deductible. It can also be argued that SRS changes the 
function of the body and is not merely a physical improvement. 
Even the Internal Revenue Code classifies a change in the 
function of the body as a deductible medical expense. 
In Levine the petitioner was required to defeat the "but 
for" test. Petitioner was required to prove two elements for 
deductibility. First is that the treatment is an essential element 
for the cure of the disease. Second is that the expenditure 
would not have occurred except for medical reasons. In 
regards to the first element, a question could be raised what 
other type of treatment could be administered to correct for 
GID? To date, there are no other generally accepted 
treatments. Another question is whether there must be only 
one clear treatment or whether several treatments could 
coexist? In regards to the second element the question could 
be raised why would one want to have a surgical operation that 
changes the function of the body other than for medical 
reasons? This is not merely an improvement to one's body, but 
a radical change. 
From an examination of the statutes and court cases, 
SRS should fall within the purview of I.R.C. § 213 as a 
deductible medical expense. This is based upon: 1) the fact 
that GID is a well-recognized mental disorder and SRS is the 
only generally accepted treatment for that disorder (based upon 
the American Psychological Association's psychiatric 
handbook on mental disorders), 2) the Internal Revenue Code 
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allows for the treatment of a mental disorder to be a deductible 
medical expense, 3) in Al-Murshidi the Tax Court found that 
expenditures for a well-recognized disease are deductible, and 
4) the petitioner met all the pre-determined rigorous criteria for 
the surgery. 
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POSSESSION, PERFECTION AND PRIORITY IN A 
FRAUDULENT ENVIRONMENT 
by 
Elizabeth A. Marcuccio * 
John W. Arpey ** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Are fraudulent mortgage banking transactions on the 
rise? Today banks operate in an environment of increased 
competition, tightening credit restrictions due to the sub-prime 
mortgage lending fiasco, and a decreased volume of loans 
processed and sold. Their financial survival is in jeopardy. 
The purpose of this article is to examine the rights of innocent 
parties who are the victims of a scheme to defraud in 
transactions involving mortgage assignments. 
A secured real property transaction consists of two documents: 
the mortgage document which creates a security interest in the 
real property, and the note which represents the debt that is 
secured by the mortgage. 
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